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Abstract
The European asylum system is a relatively advanced regional 
protection framework, in both legislative and policy terms. 
However, that same system lacks a mechanism to distribute 
responsibility fairly among the Member States, as well as legal 
avenues by which persons in need of protection can access it. To 
the backdrop of the Syrian crisis and the rising toll of migrant 
deaths in the Mediterranean Sea, this brief analyses achievements 
and shortcoming in the area of solidarity and fair-sharing of 
responsibility between Member States, as well as the external 
dimension of EU’s common asylum system. In view of the 
adoption by the European Commission of a “European Agenda 
on Migration”, it offers tangible ideas for EU policy action that 
could meaningfully develop this policy and help address the 
humanitarian tragedy on the EU’s borders.
Key words: European asylum Policy; Syrian crisis; Solidarity; Legal 
entry channels; Refugee resettlement; Humanitarian visas  
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1. State of play
Growing numbers of the forcibly displaced
Numerous crises and conflicts worldwide have 
forced more people from their homes, in the last 
years and months, than at any time in the last two 
decades1. The Syrian conflict has, for example, 
triggered the world’s largest humanitarian crisis 
since World War II, leading 3.9 million refugees to 
flee and leaving an estimated 12.2 million persons 
in need of humanitarian assistance inside Syria2. 
At the same time, significant numbers have had to 
flee other countries including Iraq, Afghanistan and 
Eritrea in order to seek asylum3. 
The vast majority of those forcibly displaced outside 
their country of origin or residence remain in 
neighboring countries. The Syrian crisis is a telling 
example in this respect. Countries bordering 
Syria are coming close to saturation, particularly 
Lebanon, which hosts the largest per capita refugee 
population in the world with almost 1.2 million 
Syria refugees4. It has to be remembered that the 
Syrian refugee crisis comes just after the Iraqi 
refugee crisis of 2006-2009, which had displaced 
around two million Iraqi citizens towards the very 
same countries: Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and 
Egypt5. 
It is against this backdrop that the relative rise 
in asylum applications to the EU28  and the EU’s 
advancement in the creation of a common asylum 
system, as well as its role as a global protection actor 
should be assessed. 
Is a Common European Asylum System in place? 
The incremental development of a CEAS has 
been agreed since the Treaty of Amsterdam and 
the Tampere conclusions of 19997. The first stage 
of development revolved around efforts at legal 
harmonization on the basis of shared minimum 
standards. However, a common asylum procedure 
and a uniform status valid throughout the EU were 
seen as the end objective. It became apparent that 
legal harmonization alone would not be enough to 
bring about this result. Therefore, the development 
of other elements, and most notably, practical 
cooperation and enhanced solidarity came up. 
1  Statement by António Guterres, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, EU Stakeholders Conference: ‘An 
open and safe Europe -- what next?’, 29 January 2014. 
2  European Commission, DG ECHO, Factsheet: Syria Crisis, April 2015. The factsheet contains facts and figures as of 
7 Apr 2015. 
3 See for example, UNHCR, Asylum Trends, First Half 2014: Levels and Trends in Industrialised Countries, October  
2014. 
4 European Commission, DG ECHO Factsheet (fn 2).
5  P. Fargues, Europe Must Take on its Share of the Syrian Refugee Burden, But How?, MPC Policy Brief, February 
2014, at 3. 
6 The latest figures released by EUROSTAT reveal that the number of asylum seekers rose to 435,000 in 2013 and 
626,000 in 2014; this was the highest number of asylum applicants within the EU since the peak in 1992. See EURO
STAT, Asylum Statistics, March 2015, accessible at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Asy lum_sta-
tistics
7 Tampere European Council, Presidency Conclusions, 15-16 October 1999.
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It was gradually recognized that there were a number 
of advantages in joining forces in the asylum area. 
There was, of course, the rather ‘inward-focused’ 
motivation of establishing a common asylum system 
in order to limit secondary movements of protection 
seekers that had reached EU territory. But there 
were, also, more ‘outward looking goals’. Notably, 
these were: coordinating action in order to have a 
strategic impact externally; collaborating with third 
countries in the management of migration flows; 
and, less prominently, boosting the possibilities of 
legal access to the EU for international protection 
seekers. 
Examined macroscopically, the CEAS is an advanced 
regional protection framework, both legislatively 
and policy-wise, that has the potential to influence 
the international refugee protection regime. 
Member States have sought to devise concrete 
mechanisms to allocate responsibility and they 
have elaborated detailed norms in areas that are 
not covered by the 1951 Refugee Convention, such 
as asylum procedures. They possess an institution, 
the Court of Justice of the EU, which is tasked with 
authoritatively interpreting the common norms, 
in an area where there is no ‘international refugee 
Court’. They have managed to move from ad-hoc 
support and exchanges of good practice to the 
institutionalization of practical cooperation efforts, 
by creating an EU agency. Finally, they have begun 
to coordinate their actions externally in an effort to 
manage, as much as possible, migration flows and to 
build protection capacity in third countries. 
Nevertheless, the EU’s asylum system is riddled 
with problems that hold back its development. 
First of all, the responsibility-allocation mechanism 
that has been devised fails to share responsibility 
(Source: European Union, 2015) 
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equitably between the Member States; it also largely 
disregards the realities faced by protection seekers 
and their preferences. More broadly, no objective 
discussion of what is a fair share of responsibility 
has ever taken place. This creates disincentives: 
on the one hand, for Member States to respect the 
obligations they have undertaken legislatively and, 
on the other, for protection seekers to abide by the 
rules, which do not take into account their links 
to specific Member States. Beyond the legislative 
and policy framework, the differentiated level of 
economic development between Member States, 
the discrepancies in their social assistance systems 
and the varying levels of investment in their asylum 
processing and reception systems, have led to 
widely diverging recognition rates and reception 
conditions. This has undercut the objective of 
curbing secondary movements between Member 
States; on the contrary it has fuelled them. 
Finally, the EU’s external asylum dimension 
remains underdeveloped and is disproportionately 
focused on capacity building, while offering meagre 
opportunities for legal entry to protection seekers. 
On the contrary, the various measures the EU has 
taken as part of its external border control or visa 
policies have stifled access to protection and have 
led asylum seekers to risk their lives in order to reach 
EU territory. The impact of these policy choices is 
witnessed most vividly in the loss of life in the waters 
of the Mediterranean. Mediterranean crossings are 
not new; however, there an ever-increasing number 
of deaths in conjunction with a record number of 
migrant crossings8. 
2. Why is reform still necessary?
A number of challenges remain unanswered by the 
status quo. Even the mention of the word (further) 
reform in this policy area is politically sensitive. 
Member States are recovering from negotiation 
fatigue after what turned out to be long-drawn 
out and controversial legislative negotiations. 
Nevertheless, our brief looks more closely at the 
issues of solidarity and fair-sharing of responsibility, 
as well as that of access to protection. We do so to 
substantiate why policy and legislative action at the 
EU level must be undertaken in order for the EU to 
live up to current and future protection challenges.
Solidarity and responsibility but still no fair-sharing 
To date, it is not clear what the scope of obligations of 
Member States under the solidarity and fair sharing 
of responsibility principle is9. EU institutions 
in different policy declarations have avoided 
pronouncing themselves on this issue and have, 
instead, adopted the so-called ‘tool-box’ approach, 
listing different measures that operationalize 
solidarity10. 
Most measures are of an operational/technical 
or financial nature. Examples of ‘solidarity as 
operational support’ are the engagement of 
the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) 
in assisting Member States that face particular 
pressures on their asylum systems. The agency is 
called to systematically identify, collect and analyze 
8 See P. Fargues and S. Bonfanti, When the best option is a leaky boat: why migrants risk their lives crossing the Medi-
terranean and what Europe is doing about it, MPC Brief 2014/5 and P. Fargues and A. Di Bartholomeo, Drowned Europe, 
MPC Brief 2014/5.
9 The wording concerning this principle was strengthened by the Lisbon Treaty; Article 80 TFEU now reads as follows: 
‘[t]he policies of the Union set out in this Chapter and their implementation shall be governed by the principle of solidarity 
and fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial implications, between the Member States. Whenever necessary, the 
Union acts adopted pursuant to this Chapter shall contain appropriate measures to give effect to this principle’.  
10 See European Commission, Communication on Enhanced Intra-EU Solidarity in the Field of Asylum: An EU 
Agenda for Better Responsibility-Sharing and More Mutual Trust, COM(2011) 835 final; European Parliament, Resolution 
of 11 September 2012 on Enhanced Intra-EU Solidarity in the Field of Asylum, (2012/2032(INI)); Council of the European 
Union, Council Conclusions on a Common Framework for Genuine and Practical Solidarity Towards Member States Facing 
Particular Pressures on their Asylum Systems, Including Through Mixed Migration Flows, Brussels, 3151st Justice and Home 
Affairs Council Meeting, March 2012.
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information regarding various aspects of national 
asylum systems under particular pressure: the 
agency fulfills this through the ‘early warning and 
preparedness system’ it has set up11.  It also supports 
actions on the ground, including the deployment of 
seconded national experts in the form of ‘asylum 
support teams’12. 
The agency carries within it great potential and 
certainly aims at fulfilling existing needs. EASO’s 
potential is however currently limited by a number 
of factors. First, budgetary constraints; the agency is 
expected to undertake its activities with a budget of 
around EUR 15,7 million, at a time when FRONTEX 
has a draft budget of around EUR 114 million for the 
same year13.  The deployment of national personnel 
for support missions is also dependent on the will 
of the Member States’ national administrations to 
make them available and agree on their deployment. 
Moreover, the agency is restrained by its own 
mandate. Some examples are the limitations 
regarding its role in joint or common processing. 
According to its Regulation it has ‘no powers in 
relation to the taking of decisions by Member States’ 
asylum authorities on individual applications for 
international protection’14. Likewise its technical 
documents and guidelines should not purport 
‘to give instructions to Member States about the 
grant or refusal of applications for international 
protection’15. 
Financially, solidarity is expressed through the 
Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund the 
following (Regulation EU Np 516/2014). The 
amounts are distributed taking into account certain 
indicators; however, they are calculated on the basis 
of absolute rather than relative figures and, therefore, 
fail to take into account the perceived ‘burden’ of 
each Member State in running an asylum system. 
In addition, the Fund is conceived in such a way 
that the current amount of EU funding only covers 
a small percentage of the costs actually incurred by 
each Member State in this area.
Physical solidarity, meaning the intra-EU transfer 
of asylum seekers or protected persons between EU 
Member States has been extremely limited to date. 
It has been applied on a small scale through ad-
hoc and voluntary initiatives that were undertaken 
exclusively in Malta. 227 individuals, mainly 
protection beneficiaries but also asylum seekers, 
were relocated from Malta in 2011 and 356 places 
were pledged for the second phase of the project 
in 201216. Intra-EU relocation initiatives have been 
limited to such an extent that they can be viewed 
as political tokens rather than as fully-fledged 
operations. 
The EU’s efforts in the field of solidarity are undercut 
by the fact that there has never been an objective 
assessment of what would be an equitable share of 
responsibility for each Member State. Therefore, any 
claim by a Member States that it is ‘overburdened’ 
cannot be objectively substantiated, and raises the 
suspicion among the others, who are also called on 
to carry part of the protection responsibility. This has 
led EU institutions to highlight that ‘it is fundamental 
to increase trust to strengthen solidarity’17.  It  has 
been observed that full compliance with asylum 
11 See Regulation (EU) No.439/2010 [EASO Regulation], Article 9 and EASO, EASO Work programme 2015, at 26. 
12 See EASO Regulation, Articles 10 and Chapter 3. 
13 See FRONTEX, Frontex Program of Work 2015, 2014. 
14 See EASO Regulation, Article 2(6).
15 See EASO Regulation, Article 12(2).
16 EASO, EASO Fact Finding Report on Intra-EU Relocation Activities from Malta, 2012, at p.4. 
17 COM(2011)835, (fn 10), at 2.
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obligations may not be realistic or meaningful 
as a precondition for solidarity18. Indeed, the 
necessity for solidarity measures normally arises 
from the inability of a particular Member State to 
fulfil obligations envisaged by CEAS instruments. 
Through an objective assessment of the protection 
capacity of each Member State, ‘inability to comply’ 
with one’s obligations would clearly be distinguished 
from ‘unwillingness to comply’. This would, thus, 
address the current tensions between Member 
States in terms of distributing responsibilities. 
External Dimension or Europe’s closed doors
To date, two types of initiatives concerning 
the system’s external dimension have been 
operationalized: Regional Protection Programs 
(RPPs) and resettlement or humanitarian 
admission programs. EASO’s mandate also contains 
a component for supporting Member States in their 
actions in the external dimension. This includes, for 
example, refugee resettlement, as well as a limited 
mandate to make exchanges with competent 
authorities of third states in technical matters 
and the implementation of regional protection 
programs. The relevant issue of legal entry channels 
to the EU has been discussed often at policy level, 
but no jointly coordinated operations have taken 
place. Member States have individually operated, for 
limited periods of time, variants of what might be 
called ‘protected entry procedures’19, or legal entry 
channels for protection seekers to the EU. With the 
growing numbers of life loss in the Mediterranean, 
unofficial policy discussions on legal entry channels 
have been intensifying.
Despite the underdevelopment of its external 
dimension, it is better understood that Europe 
cannot build a truly comprehensive asylum system 
in isolation. Policy-wise this led, first of all, to the 
inclusion, in 2011, of international protection in 
EU’s ‘Global Approach to Migration and Mobility’20. 
Moreover, the Asylum, Migration and Integration 
Fund now includes financing for Regional Protection 
Programs as part of Union actions21, whereas they 
were previously funded by external aid instruments. 
The ‘Ypres Guidelines’ also mentioned that, as part 
of the development of the EU asylum policy, a focus 
should be placed on enhancing Regional Protection 
Programmes and to increasing contributions to 
global resettlement efforts. This position depended, 
in part, on the protracted crisis in Syria22. 
Regional Protection Programs consist of a ‘tool box’ 
that would be mainly protection-oriented, however, 
cooperation on legal migration, actions on migration 
management and return were also to be included 
in the range of measures financed by the EU23. 
RPPs have taken the form of projects implemented 
primarily by UNHCR, together with local NGOs; in 
practice at country level all these projects have been 
part of broader UNHCR operations with funding 
18 M. Garlick, MPI Policy Brief: Strengthening refugee protection and meeting challenges: The European Union’s Next 
Steps on Asylum, 2014, at 5. 
19 There is no EU definition for this term of art. A study undertaken for the European Commission, defines protected 
entry procedures as ‘[a]n overarching concept for arrangements allowing a non-national to approach the potential host State 
outside its territory with a claim for asylum or other form of international protection, and to be granted an entry permit in 
case of a positive response to that claim, be it preliminary or final’; see G. Noll, J. Fagerlund and F. Liebaut, Study for the Euro-
pean Commission: On the Feasibility of Processing Asylum Claims Outside the EU against the Background of the Common 
European Asylum System and The Goal of a Common Asylum Procedure (European Commission 2002) at 20. 
20 See COM(2011) 743 final. 
21 See AMIF Regulation, Article 20. According to the same article, Union actions are ‘transnational actions or actions 
of particular interest to the Union’ that are initiated by the Commission.
22 See European Council Conclusions – 26/27 June 2014, doc. no. EUCO 79/14.
23 Ibid, at 18-19.
24 ECRE, Regional Protection Programmes: an effective policy tool?, January 2015, at 8. 
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from the EC and from different countries24. 
The first two pilot RPPs have been implemented since 
2007 in the Great Lakes area of Africa (Tanzania) 
and the Western NIS (Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus). 
Their evaluation in 2009 concluded that they were a 
successful mechanism to provide more protection 
for refugees close to regions of origin. However, 
the evaluators went on to say, their impact was 
limited due to limited flexibility, funding, visibility 
and coordination with other EU humanitarian and 
development policies, and insufficient engagement 
of third countries25.  Gradually, the programs gained 
more prominence and were introduced into further 
regions. In 2010, as well as the first two programs, 
the Commission introduced the following: the 
implementation of an RPP in the Horn of Africa 
Region (Kenya, Djibouti, and Yemen) started in 
September 201126, and an RPP in Northeastern 
Africa (covering Egypt, Libya and Tunisia but 
essentially operational in Egypt and Tunisia) started 
in December 201127. 
Finally, in response to the Syrian crisis, the EU 
launched a Regional Development and Protection 
Programme for refugees and host communities 
in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq28, which has been 
operational since July 2014. This is funded partly 
by the EC and by MS and is implemented by 
governments, UN agencies and civil society29. The 
innovative element of the latter is that it targets 
not only Syrian refugees, but also vulnerable 
host communities enhancing their economic 
opportunities and livelihood capacity. 
Regarding resettlement, more concrete policy actions 
started in 2009 when the European Commission 
launched a Communication on the establishment of 
a joint EU resettlement program30. The main guiding 
principles envisaged were: voluntary participation 
of Member States; adaptability through the 
adoption of annual priorities; enlargement of the 
scope of resettlement activity in the EU and of the 
number of Member States involved in the process; 
as well as the participation of all relevant actors such 
as UNHCR and civil society31. On this basis, after 
difficult negotiations, Member States amended the 
European Funds in 2012 in order to operationalize 
the program.
This effort was consolidated under the Asylum, 
Migration and Integration Fund which seeks to 
enhance refugee resettlement in the following 
manner: providing targeted assistance in the form of 
financial incentives (lump sums) for each resettled 
person and additional financial assistance when 
individuals under the common Union resettlement 
priorities are resettled32. Despite the fact that more 
Member States have been activated since the launch 
of the program, the overall numbers of resettled 
refugees remain modest.
25 European Commission, First Annual Report on Immigration and Asylum (2009), COM(2010)214 final, 6 May 2010, 
at 6. 
26 European Commission, Annual Report on Immigration and Asylum (2010), COM(2011) 291 final, 24 May 2011, at 6.
27 European Commission, Third Annual Report on Immigration and Asylum (2011), COM(2012)250 final, 30 May 
2012, at 16.
28 See European Commission, New EU regional development and protection programme for refugees and host commu-
nities in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq, December 2013. 
29 See 20 June 2014, Brussels – Questions and Answers: the European Commission helps refugees, http://eu-un.europa.
eu/articles/en/article_15168_en.htm
30 European Commission, Communication on the establishment of a Joint EU Resettlement Program, COM(2009) 447 
final, 2 September 2009. 
31 Ibid, at 5.
32 See AMIF Regulation, Recitals 41-43 and Articles 3(2) and 7. 
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Resettled persons33 -annual data 
(Source: EUROSTAT) 
Other legal channels of entry to the EU for protec-
tion seekers remain extremely underdeveloped. 
Nevertheless, the Syrian crisis has seen the emer-
gence of some national initiatives. It must be noted 
that the majority of those concern a limited num-
ber of persons. The most prominent legal channel 
of entry is humanitarian admission34.  Most notably, 
since 2013 Germany has pledged 20,000 places for 
Syrian refugees35. Germany has also implemented 
a program to admit privately sponsored Syrians to 
live with their relatives. This initiative is incumbent 
on the presence of family members in Germany 
who can commit to covering the transport and liv-
ing costs for their relatives for the duration of their 
stay; it involves an additional 10,000 persons36. 
France has provided close to 1,400 asylum visas for 
Syrians, which enable them to travel to France for 
the purpose of applying for asylum37. Finally, Ire-
land initiated extended family reunification for peo-
ple affected by the Syrian conflict to join close rela-
tives who are lawfully residing in Ireland38.  This led 
to 111 persons entering Ireland. The small scale of 
these operations means that the majority of protec-
tion seekers are left with no choice but to risk their 
lives in order to access protection. 
3. Ideas for EU policy action
Assessing responsibility fairly in order to enhance 
solidarity and mutual trust 
It is becoming increasingly evident that the vicious 
circle of ‘mutual mistrust’ between Member States 
can only be broken if responsibility is assessed fairly. 
To that end, Member States must agree on a system 
of evaluation of their individual share of responsi-
bility on the basis of objective indicators. Given the 
investment of Member States in the EU’s external 
borders in both rescuing lives and safeguarding the 
common EU borders39, such a mechanism should 
factor this in when seeking to establish the national 
share of responsibility. This commonly agreed eval-
uation of responsibility would objectify the assess-
ment of calls for solidarity. It would, also, reveal to 
what extent Member States are underperforming 
and it would mean more investment in building up 
their systems in terms of both human and financial 
resources.
2008 2009    2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
4,885 7,400 5,060 4,090 4,930 4,840 6,380 
33 The following individuals are included in the EUROSTAT statistics as resettled refugees: ‘persons who have been 
granted an authorisation to reside in a Member State within the framework of a national or Community resettlement scheme’; 
see: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tps00195&plugin=1.22 See Euro-
pean Council Conclusions – 26/27 June 2014, doc. no. EUCO 79/14.
34 According to AMIF ‘other humanitarian admission programmes’ means an ad hoc process whereby a Member State 
admits a number of third-country nationals to stay on its territory for a temporary period of time in order to protect them 
from urgent humanitarian crises due to events such as political developments or conflicts; see AMIF Regulation, Article 2(b). 
35 See UNHCR, Resettlement and Other Forms of Admission for Syrian Refugees, 14 April 2015. 
36  See the website of the Germany Ministry of the Interior for more details: http://www.bmi.bund.de/DE/Themen/Mi-
gration-Integration/Asyl-Fluechtlingsschutz/Humanitaere-aufnahmeprogramme/humanitaere-aufnahmeprogramme_node.
html 
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Enhancing solidarity tools 
The brief analysed the stumbling blocks to EASO’s 
capacities to support CEAS. Its financing and re-
sources should become commensurate to the lev-
el of ambition and expectations placed upon the 
agency. At the same time its mandate should be 
strengthened so that it will become legally possible 
to organise joint or common processing of asylum 
applications, as well as allowing seconded experts to 
become more operational on the ground. 
European funding distributed through AMIF should 
be strengthened so as to cover a greater part of na-
tional expenses than it actually does. Moreover, the 
indicators on the basis of which funding is distrib-
uted should be refined as they are currently limited 
to absolute figures.
Intra-EU relocation of asylum seekers and protected 
persons should be operationalized to a greater de-
gree, not least in view of the objective assessment 
of responsibility that needs to take place. In a pilot 
phase this could concern specific caseloads, such 
as refugees from Syria or those arriving in the EU 
by sea. In the future, relocation could be a compo-
nent of broader schemes of overall responsibility-
sharing, such as the policy idea to instate tradable 
refugee-admission quotas, coupled with a matching 
mechanism linking countries’ and migrants’ prefer-
ences40. 
Finally, the activation of the EU Temporary Protec-
tion Directive (Directive  2001/55/EC) should be 
seriously considered at the EU level, in view of the 
increasing numbers of asylum seekers in the EU, 
not least as a result of the conflict in Syria. This in-
strument, adopted in the aftermath of the Kosovo 
crisis, has never been applied. However, it incorpo-
rates provisions on solidarity and the balancing of 
efforts41.  These include co-operation on the intra-
EU transferral of residence of persons enjoying 
temporary protection, on the basis of the request by 
a particular Member State and subject to the con-
sent of the persons concerned. 
37  by  UNHCR,  Resettlement and other forms of admission for Syrian refugees (fn 35).
38 FRA, Legal entry channels to the EU for persons in need of international protection: a toolbox, 2015, at 9.
39 The costs of running operation ‘Mare Nostrum’ for the Italian government were estimated at 9 million Euros per 
month. 
40 See H. Rapoport and J. Fernández-Huertas Moraga, Tradable Refugee-admission Quotas: a Policy Proposal to Re-
form the EU Asylum Policy, MPC Working Paper Series, RSCAS 2014/101, 2014. 
41 See Articles 24-26, Temporary Protection Directive. 
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Allowing access to protection 
It would be helpful if the Commission issued a set 
of guidelines comprehensively compiling what dif-
ferent ways of legal access exist in different instru-
ments; some are contained in the EU visa policy 
or border policy. Therein, the Commission would 
explain how those should be interpreted in a pro-
tection-sensitive manner, highlighting examples of 
existing State practice. 
In what concerns refugee resettlement, the num-
bers of resettled refugees should be lifted. In or-
der to boost numbers, apart from state sponsored 
refugees, Member States could also explore private 
sponsorship schemes, both by family members and 
relatives, but also by private individuals, churches or 
associations: these schemes are already used in the 
US and Canada. 
The issuance of so-called humanitarian visas, i.e. vi-
sas with limited territorial validity, valid usually only 
in the Member State that issued them, must also be 
expanded to allow legal entry for protection seekers 
to the EU. Rules around this type of visa are already 
included in the Visa Code but could be refined in 
the ongoing negotiations for the amendment of this 
instrument. Moreover, Member States could make 
more frequent use of the possibility of relaxing fam-
ily reunification rules for specific caseloads, such 
as people in need of international protection from 
Syria. 
Establishing meaningful partnerships with third 
States 
The goal of EU action should be twofold. First, at-
tention and resources should be devoted to enhanc-
ing the protection capacity as well as economic de-
velopment of the countries that host large numbers 
of refugees. The overall financing of regional protec-
tion programs should be boosted and they should 
include a well-developed and resourced local devel-
opment component. This would help alleviate pres-
sures on national resources and avoid destabilisa-
tion of local societies and competition with refugee 
communities for access to basic services and a dig-
nified level of subsistence. 
Second, there should be a greater sharing of protec-
tion responsibility in human terms. This aim could 
partly be achieved by boosting refugee resettlement 
to the EU. In what concerns the Syrian crisis specifi-
cally, Member States should work with UNHCR and 
a number of countries such as the US, Canada and 
Australia, in order to agree on a global level pro-
tection scheme. This scheme would mean organis-
ing the orderly transfer to their territory of large 
numbers of refugees who have found temporarily 
protection in the neighbouring countries, whose 
capacities are now reaching the point of exhaustion. 
Such initiatives should not be developed unilater-
ally, but in full cooperation with the countries in the 
region who have need a say in the establishment of 
priorities and the use of resources.
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